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Wasitis: Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.

SALE V. HAITIAN CENTERS COUNCIL, INC:
CLOSING THE GOLDEN DOOR

"Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.

Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"'
INTRODUCTION

For decades, the United States symbolized a splendid oasis for refugees, immigrants, and political prisoners of all races, creeds, and nationalities.2 In recent years,
however, our"golden door" policies of the past have begun to quietly close.' Last tenl,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed and sanctioned this shift towards pragmatism, exclusion, and

isolation4
The purpose of this note is to carefully examine the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Sale v. HaitianCentersCouncil,Inc.5 Part II sketches the contours of our recent policies
with Haiti, and highlights the relevant refugee law involved. Part III dissects the case
itself and presents the facts, procedure, and reasoning of the majority and minority.
Finally, Part IV probes the strength of the court's analysis, and assesses the future
implications of the decision.
BACKGROUND
History Behind the Refugee Act of 1980
Shortly after World Warl, the nations of the world convened to determine standards

for the treatment of refugees.6 This assembly promulgated a treaty known as the United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees [Convention]. 7 Article 33 of the
Emma Lazarus, The New Collossus, in THE COLUMBIA GRANGERS DIC'ONARY OF POETRY QUOTATIONS 269
(Edith P. Hazen ed., 1992).
2 See generallyArthur C. Helton, The United States Government Programof Intercepting and ForciblyReturning
Haitian BoatPeople toHaiti: PolicylmplicationsandProspects, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 325,332 (1993) ('The
early years of the United States were characterized by an open immigration policy.").
' See Exec. Order No. 12,324,3 C.F.R. 180 (1982), reprintedin 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988) (allowing Coast Guard to
interdict and repatriate Haitians). See alsoExec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23133 (1992) (continuing interdiction and repatriation, but removing refugee screening process).
' See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993) (upholding Executive Order 12,807,57 Fed. Reg.
23133 (1992)).
Id.
See United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.S.T.S.
150 [hereinafter Convention].
7 Id.
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Convention protects refugees from being returned and persecuted, and grants them the
privilege of "non-refoulement."
Because the United States is not a signatory member of the Convention, 9 its obligations
are not directly binding on our govement In 1968, however, the United States acceded to
the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees [Protocol].10 By adopting the
Protocol, the United States agreed to comply withArticles 2 through 34 of the Convention."
Although our existing laws were believed to mirror the Protocol, 2 weaknesses in their
application were discovered.'3 In 1980, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationalities
Act of 1952 [NA]. 4 That amendment became known as the Refugee Act of 1980.15 Specifically, this amendment changed section 243(h) of the INA to mirror the language of
the Protocol and the Convention. 6
' Id. at 176. "Non-refoulement" is derived from the French verb refouler, meaning "to drive back or repel." GUY
S. GOODWIN-GaL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (1983). This principle embodies the idea that "no
refugee should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face persecution or danger to life or freedom."
Id.
I INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416 n.9 (1984) (holding that an alien seeking to avoid deportation must establish a
clear probability of persecution).
" The United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
[hereinafter Protocol]. Over 100 states are parties to the Convention or the Protocol. See Jon L Jacobson, At-Sea
Interception of Alien Migrants: InternationalLaw Issues, 28 WI.LIAMETrE L REv. 811, 813 (1992) (explaining
refugee law as it applies to the law of the sea).
" Stevic,467 U.S.at416. "The Protocol bound parties tocomply with the substantiveprovisions ofArticles2through
34 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees . "I.
Id.
"2Id.at417. "The President and the Senate believed that the Protocol was largely consistent with existing law. There
are many statements to that effect in the legislative history of the accession to the Protocol." Id.
1 See Suzanne Gluck,InterceptingRefugees at Sea: An Analysis ofthe UnitedStates'Legal andMoral Obligations,
61 FORDHAM L REv. 865, 866 n.5 (1993) (explaining the problems with enforcing the Protocol). Although the
United States was bound to observe non-refoulement, its "adherence to the principle, however, had been inadequate."
Id. "[To ensure compliance with its international obligations, Congress amended section 243(h) to parallel the
mandatory provisions of article 33." Id.
148 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1988 & Supp. 1111991).
IS Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-212,94 Stat. 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)) (supp. IV 1992). Section
243(h)(1) of that act states:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an alien described in section
1251(a)(4)(D) of this title) to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or
freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Id. For a complete discussion of this act, see Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The FortyYear Crisis: A
Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L REV. 9 (1981). See also David A. Martin, The
Refugee Act of 1980: Its past and Future, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 91 (1982).
" Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct 2549, 2568 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "I begin with the
Convention, for it is undisputed that the Refugee Act of 1980 was passed to conform our law to Article 33 ....
IId.
(Footnote omitted). Article 33 of the Protocol states: "1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." Protocol,
supra note 10, at Article 33.
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A History of Our Recent Policieswith Haiti

In 1980, the Mariel boatlift deposited 125,000 Cubans on the coast of Florida 1 7
During that same year, over 15,000 Haitians also entered illegally." In an effort to stem
this tide of illegal immigration, former President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order
12,324.19 This Order gave the Secretary of State authority to enter into "cooperative
arrangements" with foreign governments to prevent illegal migrationto the U.S. by sea.'
Subsequent to Executive Order 12,324, the United States entered into one such
agreement with Haiti.2' Underthe terms of thisAgreement and Executive Order 12,324,
the Coast Guard had the authority to stop," board, 23 and repatriate Haitian vessels.
Reagan made certain, however, that the United States strictly observed its international obligations concerning refugees.25 This meant the implementation of a brief
screening process to determine the possibility of refugee status.' Immigrants who had
"

Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate of US. Courts to ProtectAliens andRefugees UnderInternationalHuman Rights
Law, 100 YALE L. 2335, 2336 (1991).
1" Helton, supra note 2, at 325.
19 Exec. Order No. 12,324,3 C.F.R. 180 (1982), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988). The introduction to this
order states:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of
America including Sections 212(f) and 215(a)(1)ofthelImmigration andNationalityAct,as amended
(8 U.S.C. 1182(0 and 1185(a)(1)), in view of the continuing problem of migrants coming to the
United States, by sea, without necessary entry documents, and in order to carry out the suspension
and interdiction of such entry which have concurrently been proclaimed, it is hereby ordered as
follows....
Id.
- Id.§1.
21 Agreement on Interdiction of Haitian Immigration to the U.S., Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559 [hereinafter U.S.-Haiti Agreement]. Actually, the agreement with Haiti preceded Exec. Order No. 12,324. See Helton,
supranote 2, at 326. Specifically, the Haitian government agreed to help the United States government to "stop the
clandestine migration of numerous residents of Haiti to the United States." U.S.-Haiti Agreement, supra,at 3559.
The Haitian government also gave assurances that it would not prosecute repatriated Haitians forfleeing the country.
Id.at 3559-60.
2
Exec. Order No. 12,324, supranote 19, § 2(c)(1).
2
'A

Id.
d. § 2(c)(3).

Id.§ 3. This section states:
The Attorney General shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the
Department in which the Coast Guard is operating, take whatever steps are necessary to ensure the
fair enforcement of our laws relating to immigration (including effective implementation of the
Executive Order) and the strict observance of our international obligations concerning those who
genuinely flee persecution in their homeland.
Id.
2 Id. § 2(c)(3). This section states: "[N]o person who is a refugee will be returned without his consent." Id.The
government delegated this responsibility to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See Gluck, supranote 13,
at 870.
2
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credible refugee claims were taken to the U.S. to begin the asylum process.' Those who
did not have credible claims were taken back to Haiti. Between 1981 and 1991, only
eleven out of 23,000 Haitians who were stopped and questioned, received refugee status.'
The first notable challenge to former President Reagan's interdiction and repatriation program came in HaitianCenter v. Gracey.30 In Gracey,the plaintiffs claimed that
the program violated the United States' non-refoulement obligations under section
243(h) of the INA, and Article 33 of the Convention.3 1 This case was quickly dismissed
by the district court, which held section 243(h) does not apply to those interdicted
32
on the high seas.
On Sept. 30, 1991, a military coup ousted Haiti's democratically elected President,
Bertrand Aristide.3 3 Following the coup, hundreds of Haitians were killed, tortured,
detained or subjected to violence.' In the wake of these actions, the United States

27 See U.S.-Haiti Agreement, supranote 22, at 3559-3560. "[lIt is understood that under these arrangements the

United States Government does not intend to return to Haiti any Haitian migrants whom the United States authorities
determine to quality for refugee status." Id. See also Helton, supra note 2, at 328. See also Gluck, supranote 13,
at 870 n.30. For a thorough examination of the INS directives concerning these interviews, see Haitian Refugee Ctr.,
Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1501-02(llth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1245 (1992).
2' Exec. Order No. 12,324, supra note 19, § 2(c)(3).
See Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Aiding andAbetting Persecutors:The Seizure and Return of HaitianRefugees in
Violation of the U.N. Refugee ConventionandProtocol,7 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ.67, 70 n. 18 (1993). See also Jacobson,
supra note 10, at 816. Unfortunately, the INS officials who conducted the interviews were not properly trained in
asylum law, and made theirdecisions "based on hasty interviews on board crowded vessels." Gluck, supranote 13,
at 870.
"o 600 F.Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985), affd on other grounds, 809 E2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1404.
" See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549,2554 (1993). The United States did not support Aristide
in the election. The U.S. supported Marc L. Bazin, a former world bank official. See Carole Cleaver, Haitiin Limbo:
Bazin, Aristide, and the Generals, 76 NEW LEADER 7,7 (Jan. 25,1993). Bazin received only 12 percent of the vote
to Aristide's 67%. Id. After the coup, Bazin became the Prime Minister, and ran Haiti with the leader of the coup,
Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras. Id. On August 30, 1993, Haiti installed Robert Malval as its new Prime Minister.
See Juan J. White, HaitiMoves Closer to Democracy, U.S.A. TODAY, Aug. 311993, at 4A. Malval took the oath of
office from Aristide at Haiti's embassy in Washington D.C. Id.
See Gluck, supra note 13, at 871 (citing report issued by Americas Watch). That report stated:
In the period immediately following the coup, massacre and widespread killings were the order of
the day. Since then, techniques have become more refined but similarly brutal. Selected assassinations, disappearances, severe beatings and political unrest continue. Entire neighborhoods, particularly in the poor and populous shantytowns of Port-au-Prince and across the countryside that
voted forAristide almost unanimously, have been targeted forparticulary brutal
and conoentrated attacks.
See id. (quoting 138 CONG. REc. 513,095, 513,095 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1992)).
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imposed economic sanctions on Haiti, and suspended the repatriation of illegal
35
Haitian immigrants.

On Nov. 18, 1991, the Coast Guard reinstituted the program of interdiction and
forced repatriation.s By then, however, there was an explosion in the amount of immigrants fleeing Haiti.3 7 Eventually, it became nearly impossible to conduct adequate
38
screening interviews.
After the program was reinstituted, it was once again tested in court.39 The plaintiffs
filed a complaint seeking a temporary restraining order to stop the repatriation40 The
complaint alleged that the defendants failed to follow proper INS procedures, and violated the terms of Executive Order 12,324.41
The district court immediately granted a temporary restraining order,42 and later
granted an injunction.4 3 The government appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.' On February 4, 1992 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated
and remanded the district court's decision.'

"

Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2554. Unfortunately, the embargo has failed. See Cleaver, supranote 33, at 8. "It is the poor
who have been hit hardest by the embargo. The foreign companies that ran factories in the industrial complex have
moved out, many to the Dominican Republic, leaving 100,000people without the means of survival." Id. At the same
time the embargo has had little effect on the wealthy. Id. See also Michael Norton, Haiti Wary as Sanctions End,
AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Aug. 29, 1993, at A6. "The deaths of 10,000 Haitians were linked to malnutrition and
lack of medicine caused by the sanctions .
Id.
I..."
' Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2554.
'l See Schoenholtz, supra note 29, at 70 n.26. Between September of 1991 and May of 1992, over 36,600 Haitians
were interdicted. Id. Of those stopped, approximately 10,300 were found to have plausible refugee claims. Id.
"' See Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2555. "With both the facilities at Guantonomo and available Coast Guard cutters saturated,
and with the number of Haitian emigrants in unseaworthy craft increasing... the government could no longer both
protect our borders and offer the Haitians even a modified screening process." Id.
'9 Haitian Refugee Ctrs., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1245 (1992).
' Id. at 1502-03. Plaintiffs filed the complaint only one day after the Coast Guard reinstituted the repatriation. Id.
41 Id. at 1503. The complaint also alleged violations of the Refugee Act of 1980, Article 33 of the Protocol, and the
Fifth Amendment due process clause. Id. Specifically, the complaint attacked the interviews themselves. Id. The
plaintiffs alleged that interviews conducted on the Coast Guard ships were less than five minutes, werenot conducted
in private, and were conducted when Haitians were starving or needed medical attention. Id.
2 Id. "The temporary restraining order precluded the defendants from repatriating Haitians on board U.S. flagged
vessels or Haitians being held on land under United States control and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." Id.
43 Id. The injunction was granted on December
3, 1991. Id.
Id. Defendants first filed a motion to vacate the temporary restraining order. Id. This order was denied. Id.
o Id. at 1515. The court found that Haitians who had been interdicted on the high seas had no rights under the
Administrative Procedure Act. Id. The Court also found that Plaintiff Haitian Refugee Center had no First Amendment right of access to aliens lawfully interdicted and detained. Id. Finally, the court found that § 243(h) of the 1980
amendment only applies to Haitians within the United States. Id. at 1510.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Facts
On May 24, 1992, former President George Bush issued Executive Order 12,807.1

This order continued the interdiction and repatriation of Haitians on the high seas"'but
completely removed the refugee screening process.' Following this order, the Coast
Guard began to forcibly interdict and repatriate all Haitians found in international waters&
ProceduralHistory
After former President Bush issued Executive Order 12,807, Respondents imme-

diately moved for a temporary restraining order. ° Respondents claimed the order violated section 243(h) of the INA, and Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol.5 1

"

Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1993). The order states in parn:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, including sections 212(f)and 215(a)(l)ofthemmigration and NationalityAct, asamended
(8 U.S.C. 1182(0 and 1185(a)(1)) and whereas:
(1) The President has authority to suspend the entry of aliens coming by sea to the United States
without necessary documentation, to establish reasonable rules and regulations regarding, and other
limitations on, the entry or attempted entry of aliens into the United States, and to repatriate aliens
interdicted beyond the territorial sea of the United States;
(2) The International legal obligations of the United States under the United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (U.S. T.I.A.S. 6577; 19 U.S.T. 6223) to apply Article 33 of the
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees do not extend to persons located
outside the territory of the United States;

Id.
4" See id. The order itself does not specifically authorize the interdiction and repatriation of Haitians. However, a
White House Press statement issued the same day states: "President Bush has issued an Executive Order which will
permit the U.S. Coast Guard to begin returning Haitians picked up at sea directly to Haiti." White House Statement
on Haitian Migrants, I George Bush PUB. PAPERS 818 (1992).
4' See Exec. Order No. 12,807, supra note 46, at 23, 133. Although there is no mandate to screen for refugees, §
2(c)(3) states: "the Attorney General, in his unreviewable discretion may decide that a person who is a refugee will
not be returned without his consent." Id. President Bush also stated: "Yes, the Statue of Liberty still stands and we
still open our arms to people that are politically oppressed. We cannot, as long as the laws are on the books, open the
doors to economic refugees all over the world." 138 CONG. REC. H3,911, H3,911 (daily ed. May 28, 1992).
'9 Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1353 (1992), cert granted, 113 S.Ct. 52 (1992), andrev'd,
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993).
' Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549,2556 (1993).
si McNary, 969 F.2dat 1353. Respondents also claimed violations of: (l) the 1981 U.S.-Haiti Executive Agreement,
(2) the Administrative Procedure Act, and (3) the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's due process
clause. Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol27/iss2/6

6

Wasitis: Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.

Fall, 1993]

SALE V. HAMAN CENrTEs COUNL, INC.

The district court denied this application, holding that section 243(h)(1) does not
apply to actions on the high seas,5 2 and that the Protocol is not self-executing. 3 Respondents then appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.'
The Second Circuit reversed the district court, and held that Executive Order 12,807
violates section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality act of 1952.51 The Supreme

Court then granted Certiorari, 6 and the case was orally argued on March 2, 1993. 51
Reasoning of the Majority
The argument before the Supreme Court focused on two issues.5" First, does Executive Order 12,807 violate section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952.11 Secondly, does Executive Order 12,807 violate Article 33 of the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 60
By an eight to one decision, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate
court.61 The Majority held that neither section 243(h) of the INA, norArticle 33 of the

Protocol apply to actions taken by the Coast Guard on the high seas.62

I

Id. Although he denied the injunction, the district court judge "called the United States' actions 'unconscionable',
'particularly hypocritical', and 'a cruel hoax."' Id.
Id. The district courtjudge stated "[A]lithough '[ojn its face,Article 33 imposes a mandatory duty upon contracting
states such as the United States not to return refugees to countries in which they face political persecution', our prior
decision in Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218 (2d Cir. 1982) held that the convention's provisions are not selfexecuting." See id. (quoting Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., v. McNary, No. 92 CV 1258, 1992 WL 155853 at *11
(E.D.N.Y Apr. 6, 1992)). The district court judge did not address the other arguments. See id.
A non-self executing
treaty requires legislative enactment to become binding. See Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law
of TreatiesBefore UnitedStates Courts,28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 305 (1988). A self-executing treaty goes into effect
without a statute codifying it. Id.
4 McNary, 969 F.2d at 1354.
IId. at 1367. The appellate court stated:
The Plain language of § 243(h)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act clearly states that the
United States may not return aliens to their persecutors, no matter where in the world those actions
are taken. In view of this, plaintiffs arguments regarding the self-executing nature of Article 33.1
of the Refugee Convention are largely academic, since § 243(h)(1) provides coextensive protection.
Id.
51 McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 52 (1993), rev'd, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.CL
2549 (1993).
-' See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993).
59 Id.
" Id.
53

6D Id.

61 Id. at 2567.

6 Id. at 2550.
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a. Section 243(h) of The INA
The Majority begins its analysis with an examination of the text and structure of the
INA. 63 First, the Majority claims that a President's actions are not bound by section
243(h)(1) of the INA." This reasoning relies heavily on § 1103(a) and other sections of
the INA, which confer specific responsibilities on cabinet members." The Majority
concludes that section 243(h)'s directives apply only to the Attorney General."6
Secondly, the Majority determines that the INA only binds the Attorney General in
her"normal responsibilities."67 Because the INA does not specifically cover interdiction
and repatriation on the high seas, the Majority believes the Attorney General is not bound
in the situation at hand. 6"
Thirdly, the Majority relies on the principle that Acts of Congress do not ordinarily
apply outside our borders.69 Because the INA does not explicitly elucidate an extraterritorial effect, the Majority believes there is a strong presumption that Congress intended
only a domestic effect.70
Lastly, the Majority relies on the changes in the INA that were made by the 1980
amendment." These changes indicate that section 243(h) protects only two types of
refugees: Those physically within the United States ("deportable"), and those within the
72
United States territory, but not physically within the United States ("excludable").
Because the Haitians were in international waters and not U.S. territory, the Majority
73
would exclude them from these two protected classes.

63 Id. at 2558.
" See id. at 2558-59. "We cannot say that the interdicion program created by the President, which the Coast Guard

was ordered to enforce, usurped authority that Congress had delegated to, or implicated responsibilities that it had
imposed on, the Attorney General alone." Id. at 2559.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 2559. "The reference to the Attorney General in the statutory text is significant not only because that term

cannot reasonably be construed to describe either the President or the Coast Guard, but also because it suggests that
it applies only to the Attorney General's normal responsibilities under the INA." Id.
" See id. at 2560.

9 See id. "Even if Part V of the Act were not limited to strictly domestic procedures, the presumption that Acts of
Congress do not ordinarily apply outside our borders would support an interpretation of § 243(h) as applying only
within United States territory." Id.
10 Id.
71 Id. at 2560-62.
1 Id. at 2561. "The 1980 amendment erased the long-maintained distinction between deportable and excludable
aliens for purposes of § 243(h)." Id.

" See generally id. at 2560-62.
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Thus, the Majority concludes that section 243(h) applies in only one context: the
domestic procedures by which theAttorney General determines whether deportable and
excludable aliens may remain in the United States.74
b. The Convention
After concluding that section 243(h) of the INA does not apply extratenitorially, the
Majority examines the 1951 Convention. 75 First, the Majority examines the text of
76
Article 33, and finds ample support for its conclusions.
Specifically, the Majority believes that the words "expel or return" from Article 33
mirror the words "deport and return" from section 243(h)." Thus, once again, the
Majority concludes that the INA's protections are only afforded to those aliens who are
7
within the country or within the country's territory.
Finally, the Majority traces the specific negotiating history of the 1951 Convention. 79 The Majority relies on statements made by a delegate from the Netherlands who
believed that article 33 did not apply extraterritorially.s Thus, the Majority concludes
that Article 33 does not apply to aliens interdicted on the high seas."
Reasoning of the Minority
Justice Blackmun is the lone dissenter.8 2 He criticizes the Majority's reasoning,
and openly questions their humanitarian compassion. 3 Justice Blackmun believes
71
71
76

Id. at 2562.
See id. at 2562.
See id. at 2562-63. "Like the text and the history of § 243(h), the text and negotiating history of Article 33 of the

United Nations Convention are both completely silent with respect to the Article's possible application to actions
taken by a country outside its own borders." Id.
' Id. at 2563. "Article 33.1 uses the words 'expel or return ("refouler")' as an obvious parallel to the words 'deport
or return' in section 243(h)(1)." Id.
7'
See id. at 2565. "Because the text of Article 33 cannot reasonably be read to say anything at all about a nation's
actions toward aliens outside its own territory, it does not prohibit such actions." Id. (footnote omitted).
7 Id.
w Id.at2566. "'In order to dispel any possible ambiguity and to reassure his Government, he wished to have it placed
on record that the Conference was in agreement with the interpretation that the possibility of mass migrations across
frontiers or of attempted mass migrations was not covered by article 33."' Id. (quoting Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the Thirty-Fifth Meeting, U.N.Doc. A/
Conf.2/SR.35, at 21-22 (July 25, 1951)).
S6 Id. at 2567. "We do not read that text to apply to aliens interdicted on the high seas." Id.
2

See id.
at 2567.
See id. at 2577 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun states:
The refugees attempting to escape from Haiti do not claim a right of admission to this country. They do
noteven argue that the Goverment has no right to intercept their boats. They demand only that the United
States, land of refugees and guardian of freedom, cease forcibly driving them back to detention, abuse, and
death. That is a modest plea, vindicated by the Treaty and the statute. We should not close our ears to it.
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that the word "return" as used in Article 33 and section 243(h) applies to all aliens,
including the Haitians. 4
Justice Blackmun looks to the ordinary meaning of "retum" and finds it unambiguous.8 5 He also believes that a President's actions must comply with section 243(h)'s
mandatory directives. Furthermore, Justice Blackmun finds the presumption against
extraterritoriality irrelevant. 87 Finally, Blackmun believes that the changes in 1980 to the
INA illustrate expanded protection for refugees beyond the scope of the Majority's interpretation.88
ANALYSIS
Textual Arguments From Section 243(h)
The Majority begins its analysis by examining the text of Section 243(h)(1) of the
INA.8 9 That provision reads:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an
alien described in section 1251(a)(4)(D) of this title) to a country if the
Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinionY
Generally, when a court is interpreting undefined statutory terms, the court must
look first at the "ordinary meaning" of the words themselves. 91 In section 243(h)(1), the
word "return" is undefined by the rest of the INA provisions.' Therefore, a determination of the "ordinary meaning" of "return" should be the first interpretive norm used.

See id. at 2568. "Vulnerable refugees shall not be returned." Id.
Id.
I5
Id. at 2574. "Accordingly, there is no merit to the argument that the concomitant legal restrictions placed on the
Attorney General by Congress do not apply with full force in this case." Id.
"7Id. at2576. "Thejudicially created canon of statutory construction against extraterritorial application of the United
States law has no role here...." Id.
" Id. at 2574. "The import of these changes is clear. Whether 'within the United States' or not, a refugee may not
be returned to his persecutors." Id.
19 Id. at 2558.

8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962). See also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987)
(emphasizing the courts' duty to examine ordinary meaning).
" Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350,1360 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Not until the executive's recent actions
in 'reaching out' to repatriate Haitians has litigation attention shifted to the term 'return,' which is nowhere defined
in the INA."), cert. granted, 113 S.Ct. 52 (1992), rev'd, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993).
'0
'5
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The Majority's analysis, however, does not follow this logic. Instead of examining

the ordinary meaning of "return," the Majority's opinion begins with other interpretive
norms. 93 By not following the understood method of statutory construction, Stevens
begins the opinion in an unfocused manner that weakens the overall legal analysis.
The Majority's first textual argument deduces that a President's Executive Orders
are immune from section 243(h)(1)'s directives because they bind only the Attorney
General. 9 This overly literal conclusion is confusing. Congress understands that the

President's agent fordealing withimmigration matters is theAttomeyGeneral. 9 Executive Order 12,807 even includes the Attomey General in the chain ofcommand, and gives
her the authority to return aliens." More importantly, immigration policies are "entrusted exclusively to Congress," and not to the Executive branch.97 By semantically

skirting this duty, the Majority is sanctioning an expansion of executive powers that is
not in accord with previous decisions.98
The Majority believes that the 1980 amendment expanded section 243(h)'s protections to include only "excludable" aliens. 99 Unfortunately, the Majority relies not on the
legislative history of the amendment, but on one 1958 case as support for its position. 1°

In other sections of the INA, Congress clearly delineated this exact geographical restric-

91 Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2559. The court begins by claiming a President's actions are not controlled by § 243(h)(1). Id.
The court then looks to the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. at 2560.
9 Id.
9- McNary, 969 F.2d at 1360 (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)).
" Exec. Order No. 12,807, supranote 46, at 23133.
9' See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 767 (1972). "'But that the formulation of these policies is entrusted
exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial tissues ofour body politic
as any aspect of our government ... ' Id. (quoting Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954)).
" See e.g., id. at 766. "The court without exception has sustained Congress' 'plenary power to make rules for the
admission of aliens .. I.'
Id.(quoting Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118,123 (1967)). "'[O]ver no conceivable subject
is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens." Id. (quoting Oceanic
Navigation Co. v. Strahan, 214 U.S. 320,339 (1904)). See also Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547
(1895). Justice Harlan states:
The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to prescribe the terms
and conditions upon which they may come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that
regard enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention, is settled by
our previous decisions.
Id.
" See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549, 2561 (1993) ("The 1980 amendment erased the longmaintained distinction between deportable and excludable aliens for the purposes of § 243(h).").
"®See id.at 2560-61. Bu see also id. at 2561 n.33 (quoting H.R.REP. No. 96-608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 30(1979)).
The majority relies on Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958). Id.
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tion.t0° Clearly, Congress could have stipulated the same geographical limitation in
section 243(h) if that were its intent.
PresumptionAgainst Extraterritoriality
The Majority also relies on a canon of construction known as the "presumption
against extraterritoriality." 2 This canon embodies the idea thatActs of Congress do not
ordinarily apply outside our borders. 10 3 The presumption, however, only applies when
congressional intent is unexpressed.' ° 1
The Majority's reliance on this presumption is debatable. The Refugee Act of 1980
specifically deleted a territorial restriction, expanded the scope of protection for refugees, and made it's duties mandatory.'10 Moreover, matters of immigration, repatriation,
and refugees overtly implicate international matters. In this context, Congress' intent to
apply the statute extraterritorially is clearly expressed. Therefore, the relevancy of this
presumption is questionable at best.
Convention and Protocol
In 1969, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [Vienna Convention]"10
established rules to govem the enforcement of all other treaties.t °7 Article 31 of that
Convention specifically dictates methods of treaty interpretation for domestic courts."
Because the United States has never ratified the Vienna Convention, however, Article
31's directives are not specifically binding on our court system.t9
See e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (adjustment of refugee status); 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(I) (1988
& Supp. IV 1992) (defining "special immigrant" for visa purposes); 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1)-(2) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992) (eligibility for suspension of deportation).
Im See Sale, 113 S.CL at 2560.
13 See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S.Ct. 1227 (1991).
101

It is a long-standing principle ofAmerican law "that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." ... It serves
to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result
in international discord.
Id. at 1227 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,285 (1949)). The presumption is also rooted in the belief
that Congress generally delegates with domestic concerns in mind. See Smith v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 1178, 1183
n.5 (1993).
104 See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
'o See Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2574 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the changes made by the Refugee Act of 1980).
'V ViennaConventiononthe LawofTreaties,May23,1969,1155 U.N.T.S.331 (enteredintoforceJanuary27,1980),
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Article 31 states: "A treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose." Id.
"v' Frankowska, supra note 53, at 285.
'm See Frankowska, supra note 53, at 299.
159 See id.
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BecauseArticle 31 does notapply to oursystem, the Supreme Courtlooks elsewhere
for guidance. Currently, our Supreme Court looks to a variety of interpretive norms
when interpreting a treaty. 10 These norms are derived from prior cases, the Restatements, and customary international law. I1
Prior cases indicate that the Court should follow a pattemed hierarchy of interpretive
norms. First, the court should consider the "ordinary meaning" of the words used.11 2 If
a passage is ambiguous or hard to discern, the court should then look to other methods
of interpretation.113
In Sale,the Majority first considers the text ofArticle 33 of the Convention."I4 Again,
instead of first addressing the "ordinary meaning" of the words, however, the Majority
first looks to other methods of interpretation.I"
When the Majority does address the "ordinary meaning" of the words "expel or
return," it finds that they mirror "deport or return" from section 243(h)(1) of the INA.1 6
This reasoning is suspect because the words from the treaty were written twenty-eight
years before the words from the INA.

110 See James C. Wolf, The Jurisprudenceof Treaty Interpretation,21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1988).
'"

See id.

See Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982). "The clear import of treaty language
controls unless 'application of the words of the treaty according to theirobvious meaning effects a result inconsistent
with the intent or expectations of its signatories."' Id. (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49,54 (1963)).
See also Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1985). "The analysis must begin, however, with the text of the
treaty and the context in which the written words are used." Id.
n3 See VolkswagenwerkAktiengesellschaftv. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988). "Othergeneral mles of construction may be brought to bear on difficult or ambiguous passages. 'Treaties are construed more liberally than private
agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the
negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties."' Id. (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392,
396 (1985), in turn quoting Choctaw Nations of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973)).
114 Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549, 2563 (1993) (examining Article 33). Article 33 states:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers ofterritories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who,
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to
the community of that country.
See Convention, supra note 6, at 19 U.S.T.S. 6276; See also Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2563.
112

11'Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2563 (comparing article 33.1 to article 33.2).
116 Id.
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The Majority also looks at the negotiating history of the treaty, and relies on oral
statements that were neithervoted on nor ratified." 7 This reliance is questionable. Under
United States law, an oral statement not embodied in writing and not expressed to the
government is not applicable to determine intent."" Here the statements made were
placed "on the record."' 19 Clearly, there is room to debate whetherornot these statements
should be admissible to determine intent.
PrecedentialValue
The precedential value of this case is unclear. Prior decisions concerning treaty
interpretation made greater use and applied greater importance to ordinary meaning. 120
However, this Court seems very willing to go beyond "ordinary meaning," and inves2
tigate other methods of interpretive norms.' '
By going beyond the "ordinary meaning" of a treaty, this decision moves our law
further away from the Vienna Convention's strict standards of interpretation.'1 This
more liberal approach seems to reflect the Supreme Court's willingness to interpret
treaties on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, by allowing the executive branch to escape section 243(h)'s directives, the
Court is severely weakening the INA. If the reasoning used in this case is expanded into
other areas of law, the executive branch could enjoy an expansion of powers far beyond
that which Congress intended.
Policy Implications
Perhaps policy considerations played a major factor in the Court's decision. The
Majority seems to feel strongly that most Haitians are fleeing to the United States just
to escape poverty. 23 Only Justice Blackmun believes that most Haitians are fleeing
oppression and persecution.' 24
Id. at 2565-66 (relying on remarks made by the representative from the Netherlands).
"'
See Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341,360 (1934). Limited use of negotiating history to determine intent "has
no application to oral statements made by those engaged in negotiating the treaty which were not embodied inany
writing and were not communicated to the government of the negotiator or to its ratifying body." Id.

"9

Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2569-71.

1' See supra note 91 and supporting text.
121 See supra note 93 and supporting text.

'2

See supra note 106.

113 S. Ct. at 2567. Inclosing,JusticeJohn Paul Stevens states: "This case presents apainfully common
situation in which desperate people, convinced that they can no longer remain in their homeland, take desperate
measures to escape. Although the human crisis is compelling, there is no solution to be found in ajudicial remedy."
Id.
'
See id. at 2577 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
'23See Sale,

'

See supra note 17.
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Although it is not mentioned in the opinion, the Court could be remembering the
effects that the 1980 Cuban migration has had on Southern Florida.125 Another large
migration of refugees could cause racial tension, discord, and further economic problems for Miami and southern Florida.
This case could also have a significant effect on the Presidency of Bill Clinton.
During his candidacy, Clinton criticized former President George Bush for his policies
on Haiti.'2 After inauguration, however, Clinton changed his mind dramatically, and
upheld Bush's policies. 27 If human rights violations continue in Haiti, Clinton will be
harshly criticized for breaking his campaign promise.
This decision may also increase racial tension in this country. Traditionally, United
States refugee policies have favored Europeans and Asians.l 2 By excluding black
Haitians, this decision could be used by black leaders as another example of racial prejudice.
Perhaps a lasting effect of this case will be the lost prestige America may now feel
around the globe. In a world where there are more than eighteen million refugees, 29 we
have calmly and quietly sanctioned exclusion and repatriation. Our image as the "melting pot" of freedom will surely suffer.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Executive Order 12,807 is still the law of the land. The Coast Guard
continues to interdict and repatriate all Haitians. Stevens' majority opinion could signal
an expanded theory of treaty interpretation that moves away from the constraints of the
Vienna Convention. The size of the majority indicates that the Court is in unison in this
area, and is willing to defer to the executive branch.

126 Anthony Lewis, Abroadat Home; The Two Clintons,N.Y.TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1993, at A 17. During his campaign,

Clinton stated: "I am appalled by the decision of the Bush Administration to pick up fleeing Haitians on the high seas
and forcibly return them to Haiti before considering their claim to political asylum. This process must not stand."
Id.
1I" Gluck, supra note 13, at 867.
1n See Helton, supra note 2, at 333.
'2

See Helton, supranote 2, at 329.
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As this paper goes to press, problems in Haiti continue.' 3° An embargo is scheduled
to be initiated, and the United States appears willing to use force to reinstall democracy.'
Only time will tell if Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. is a just decision based on
pragmatic and societal concerns, or simply a "cruel hoax"' 13 2 implemented against the
Haitian people.
DENNIS E. WASlTS

11 See Bill Nichols, HaitiEmbargoto Begin; U.S. Talks Tough, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 18, 1993, at 1A (discussing the
implementation of sanctions against Haiti and using force to protect Americans there).
' See id.
3 See supranote 52.
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